The concept of a Nash equilbrium is the most comon equllibriua eoncapt used in social sciences, in particular in economics. In addition, in recent years, ít has been applied successfully Sn biology to explain certain atable patterns of anímal and plant populatlons (compare e.g. ! [aynard Smíth (1982) and for a survey of the more recent developments ín this field Hinea (1987) ). In these applications a Nash equílibrium ia conaidered aa the stable outcome of an evolutionary process. One feed-back of theae developments to game theory as applied in social aciences haa been a revival of interpretations of Nash equilíbrium as the result of a learning proceas (compare e.g. Crawford (19g8) and Crawford and Haller (1987) ).
There are indeed tvo competing interpretations of Nash equilibrlum: one takes a Nash equílíbrium as the stable outcome of a rather unapecífied learning process, while the other treats it as the only aelf-enforcing outcome of an unspecified negotiation process. The flrst of theae interpretations is best exemplified by the descríption of equilibrium for a duopoly as set out already in Cournot (1838). According to thía view duopolísts choose the profi[-maximiaing level of output taking the choice of the competitor as índependent of their ovn action. An iteration of thia process leads (íf it converges) to an equíllbrium vhere each agent haa the profit-maximising cholce of his output given the optimal choice of the other player, i.e. a Nash equilibrium results. Indeed as long as there is a unlque Nash equilibríum of the game, this ís the only natural stable situation no matter what the particular form of the adjustment process in beliefs ia 1We vould llke to thank Vince Crawford for helpful coments in the early staQes of chis paper. Hans I?aller acknowlednes the hospitality and financial sunPort by CentER, KUB, and NWO, fíchberger, Haller, NiIne
2
Bayesian learning (compare e.g. Noulin (1986) for a detaíled analysis of Cournot-type adjustment processes). If there are multlple Nash equlllbria, hovever, then the precíse modeling of adjustment mattera.
Since multipllcity of equilibria ia a pervaslve property of gamea and ít is ímpossible to select among these potentíal outcomea of a game, another ínterpretatlon has been favoured in recent years. Presuming that agents can communicate but not commit themselvea before the actual gaae atarts, Nash equílibria are the only outcomes of auch a pre-game negotiation procesa slnce they are self-policing in the sense that no agent would have an incentive to break away from such an agreement as long as every othez pleyer follows it. Note however that one would have to model the pre-game negotiatlons to predíct vhich of the potential equilibria v111 be played Sn
[he end (compare R. Aumann (1987) as an example for this view).
It is characteristic for both of these interpretations that thay point to the need of specífying some unmodeled part of the game to come Co a precise predictlon of the outcome of a game. Obviously, this need doea not arise in games with a unique Nash equilibrium since in these cases any specification of adjustment or learning and any pre-game negotlation process will lead to the same f1na1 outcome. Put differently, a Nash equilibrium is a necessazy condition for equilibrium behavlour of rational agenta in any adjus[mant process or in any pre-game negotlatlon vithout commitment, but not a sufficlent one.
Not surprisingly therefore, more than ten years of discusaion have focusad on the problem of "refinement" of Nash equilibrlum (compare E. Van Dame (1987) ) for an excellent survey of thís literature). The main objective of this approach has been an attempt to Lmpoae 'reasonable' additíonal constraints on the equilibria of general games to reduce the nuaber of Nash equilíbria preferably to one. In some special cases this attempt haa proved to be extremely successful as in bargainíng theory vhare, for the case of complete ínformation, a subgame perfectness requlrenent reducea the numbet of Nash equílibría from a continuum to one (compare e.g. A. Rubinatain (1982) ). Note however that this raquired explicit speclfication of all details of the bargaining process and that the resulting subgame perfect equilibríum depends crucially on theae detalls (e.g, diacount rates, It is before this background that one has to consider the recent ínterest ín the treatment of Nash equ111brium 1n blology. An evolutionary atable equílibrium has been interpreted in thía context as the equíllbrlum of an evolutionary adjustment process. In contrast to game theory 1n general, there has been more emphasis on research in diffarent evolutionary adJustment processes vhich míght or might not converge to Nash equíllbría (compare e.g. Hines (1987) ). Therefore, one vay to approach the problem of how to predict vhich Nash equilibrium w111 arise, inatead of trying to reduce the number of equilibria, ls to look for rather general learníng processes whlch may lead to Nash equilibrium outcomea. This approach haa been chosen by Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and the proceas rhich thay consider is called the "tracing procedure". Though not very intuitive as a learning mechanism, ít determinee an ad]ustsent procesa leading from soma príor beliefs to a specífic equilibrium. Hence, it ia possible to asaociate different Nash equilibria with dlfferent prlor beliefa.
A similer approach vill be pursued ín chís paper for a aEmple but often uaed class oE games, namely 2x2 macrix games. In contrast to Harsanyí and Selten (1988) , however, this paper will focus on the rather intuitive notion of The idea about learníng from past strategy choices which is advanced 1n this paper ímplies of course a sequence of playa. In addition, it requirea playera vho are uncertaín about thelr opponanta' behaviour. The unceztainty can be cauaed by the inability or unvillingness to agree on the aelectlon of one of the several equllibria or by incomplete inforiation concerning players' objectives. A further requirement of the learning concept forwarded heze ís that, despíte their uncertaínty, players assume that their opponents repeat certain (mixed) atrategies which can be infered from observation of their behaviour. Finally, players are required to be 'naive' in ignoring the possíbíllty that their opponents míght also learn from and respond to past strategy choíces. Such naive learníng seems justifiable wheze a player enters a social situation assuming that a certain equilibríun unlrnovn to hia has been established aa a standard of behaviour.
One of the surprising results of this paper is the fact that such belíefs, if held by all players end thereEore necessarily íncorrect, vlll ]ead to NasFi equilibrium behaviour vhlch justlfiea these belíefa retrospectively. On the other hand, as outlined in the paper, the prior beliefs whích agents hold ínfluence greatly the probabilíty of reachíng one or the other of several equilibria of an underlying game with multiple Nash equíllbria. It seems that such a scenario of players being uncertain about their opponents' behaviour is rather common ín social science appllcations (compare in this context in particular Schelling (1980) , chapter 4).
Recently, the idea of Bayesían learníng hae been used in different game theoretic contexts by Fudenberg and Kreps (1988 ), Canníng (1989a , 1989b ), lordan (1990a ,1990b , Kalai and Lehrer (1990), and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . It is impossíble to discuss these different approachea in detail here (conpare Eichberger (1990) rather represents a general property of such learning proceasea. On the other hand, the ídea to uae such a learníng approach to obtaín a probabílity distribution on the set of Nash equilibria provides a pro~laing approach for applied work plagued by the multiplicity of Nash aquilibrla.
The folloving sectíon vill provide a characterisatlon of the Nash equilibrius aet of 2x2 matrix games for arbitrary payoff parameters. Section 3 describes the Bayslan learning process consídered and dlacusaes the equiltbríum concept. In addítíon, it provides reaults vhich allow to assocíate with any prior belief system a probabilty of reaching any of the possible Nash equilíbria. In section 4, it ís shown how these results can be used to obtain a probabíllty of reaching each of several equtlíbría. The fínel sectlon provides exanples shoving the dependence of these results on the type of prior díatributlon. The paper concludea with some remarks on open questtona.
Classifícatíon of 2 x 2 games
Consider the following general form of a 2 x 2 matrix game:
Obviously, S1 -~T,B) and SZ -(L,R) are the seta of pure atrategies for player 1 and 2 respectively. The set of mixed strategies for player 1 1s
given as N1~((mT,mB) e IR}) mT t mB -1). Simílarly, one has !12 aa the aet of mixed strategies of player 2. 51nce there are juat two purn atrategiea for each player, one can ídentlfy each player's aet of mixed strategiea with the unit i nterval, i.e. Ní -[0,1] for i-1,2. Gíven this convention, q e 1 Bavesian learning (0,1] determines the mixed strategy mT -ql and~8 -1-ql for player 1.
Similarly, each q2 E(0,1] definea a mixed strategy for player 2.
Note that throughout this paper pure strategles ere identified with míxed strategles giving probability one to a pure strategy.
Pzopoaition 2 
(iii) If Bi~(ni-B1)~0 for some i, i-1,2, and not (B1~0, Bj -0) or (Bi~0, Bj -nj) for j ri holds, then there exists exactly one pure stra[egy Nash equilibríum and no mixed strategy equilibrium.
(iv) In all other cases [here exist either two pure strategy equllibria, one of whlch contains dominated strategies, or a contlnuum of mixed strategy equilibria contaíning at least one pure atrategy equilibríum.
A proof for thís proposition can be found ín the appendix. Note that case If player i believea that his opponent pursues a certain strategy and if the game is played repeatedly, player í can uae the observed behaviour of hia opponent to learn about this player's behaviour even if he ia lgnorant aa to hia payoff. Note in particular that the sequence of games played is not consídered as one supergame.
The learníng process
A natural way to think about learning ís a Bayeaian learning process. whrre yj denotes the expected probablltty of player j uaLng hia first strategy given player i's prior dístributionojj. Noteo that y~E Nj holds.
Hence, one can view the product measure of jj and pj as a joínt probability Bayeslan learning parameters characterísing player 1's príor belíefs. Nence player 1 expecta player 2 to choose hís fírst strategy L vith probability a2~(aZt,~2) and hia strategy R with probabílity~Z~(a2t~Z) -1-aZ~(a2t~2), Similazly player 2 expects player 1 to choose T vith probabílity al~(alt~l) and B vith probabilíty~1~(alt~l).
Suppose that player 1 observes that player 2 chooses L. Then ona gets the following updated dístzibution The expected mixed strategy of player 1 accotding to player j's bellefs in period t after observation of (sr)t-1 can nov be 1 r-1 written in the following convenient form:
Note that for t-1 the expected mixed strategy is based on oi and~i, i.e.
the prior bellefs, only, whlle for any t 1 1 it dependa on the vhola hiatory of observed strategy choices (sr)t-1 i r-1' Lemma 3.1 collects some useful propertíes of this learning process.
Lemma 3.1: For anY ai,~1~0, let qi(t)~qi(ní(t-1);ai,~i). holds for all r Z T, then lim q(t) -1(-0).
Proof: Obvious.B efore proceeding to the next section a remark on the learning process ia in order. The learning process induced by the beta dlstribution resembles the so-called "fictitious play' as introduced ín the literature by Robinson (1951) and analysed by Brown (1951), Shapley (1964), and Rosenmsller (1971) .
Though Che process was mainly used as an 1[eratlve method to deríve the Nash equílíbrium of a zero-sum game, some of the results from this literature carry over to our more ganeral and differently motlvated epproach.
Nash equilibrlum and learning

Bayesian learníng
Gíven hís prior bellefs oi and~i and after observing ( a~)~.i, the best reply function of player j( a selection from the beat reply correspondence 3.1) can be written as
Note that the best reply functlon has been written as the optimel probability of playing a player's first strategy.
In each round of the game, each player has beliefs based on past observations, chooses a mixed strategy vhich maxímises his expected payoff, and observes the pure strategy actually played by his opponent. A aequence of games is therefore determined by the sequence (91(nl(t-1):o1.91), sl, q2(n2(t-1):o2.~2). s2)t-1.
Definition: For a given two-player 2x2 matrix game and prior beliefs (oi'~1)i-1,2' an equiIlbrium wlth learning ia a point expectation for each player (q1,q2), vith qi~lim qí(ni(t-1);ai,Aí) for i-1,2, auch that t -i o ql E rl(q2). and qZ E r2(ql) hold.
According to this definítion, an equilibrium with learning ia characterised by limíting beliefs about the opponenta' behavlour which coincide with actual behaviour. Hence, rational expectationa about the opponent's strategy choice obtain 1n an equilibrium with learning. Bayesian learning Note hovever that the definition of an equ111brium vith learning ia ln terns of the best response correspondence 3.1 and not the selection given in 3.3.
This selection ls discontinuous at the míxed strategy equilibrium strategy.
Horeover, a player 1s hardly ever indifferent about his stzategy choice throughout the game. Hence, the probablllty oi has no role to play in the determination of limiting beliefs qi. If q~correaponds to a pure strategy equilíbrium, then this fact will be learned by player ] eventually. On thẽ other hand, if qi corresponda to a mixad atratagy aquilibriua, then it need not coincide vith a beat responae o1 vhich haa baen selected from the correapondence at that point. ihia followa since a player suy switch from one pure strategy to the other (thus, appro:lmating the mixed strategy ín relatlve frequency), but will never find it opti~al to atick to hia~ixed strategy.
As vill be shovn below, the learning process will eventually converge to the míxed strategy equilibrlum, even if oi ís not a mixed equíllbrlum strategy.
The following proposition shows that it 1s sufflcient for existence of an equilibrium vith learning to ahow that learning actuslly converges. (ili) Suppose ol~(olt~l) 1 (d2-b2)~(a2td2-b2-c2) and a2~(aZt~2) G(dl-cl)~(altdl-bl-cl) holda ín the begínning.
In this case, ql(t) G 91(t-1) as long as ql(t-1)~(dZ-b2)I(aZfd2-b2-c2) and q2(t)~q2(t-1) as long as qZ(t-1) G(dl-cl)~(altdl-bl-cl) holds.
Since, by lemma 3.1, monotonlc grovth will lead to ql(~1) G(dz-b2)~(a2td2-b2-c2) and q2 ( 
Selectíon of equilíbria i n terms of prior bellefs
The analysis of the prevíous section points to the possibillty to select among different Nash equíllbria in regard to the príor beliefs of the players. Put differently, wíll a particular set of prior beliefs give rise to a particular Nash equílibriuml ]n this sectlon, the case of games wlth more than one Nash equílibrlus vlll be consldered only. Without loss of generality, assume that ( C11-Bi).Bi~0
and Bi~0 for i-1,2 hold, í.e.
dl-cl~0, al-bl 1 0, d2-b2~0 , and a2-c2 1 0.
In thls case, ( mT,mL) -(0,0), ( mT,mL) -(1,1), and ( mT,a~) -(ntj"~), with í~,.~) -í(d2-b2)Iía2td2-b2-c2),ídl-cl)I(altdl-bl-cl)) . are the three Nash equilibria of the game.
Bayesian learning
The existence results in section 3 are not sufficient to anavar this question, sínce í t is not obvíous that learning leads to a unlque equilibríum for arbítrary prior belíefs. Nevertheless, for sose prior beliefs leazning leads to a unique equilibriun. Note that the space of all prior beliefs for the class of beta distribution functiona equals IR} and consider the following subsets:
A-l(al,~l,a2,~2)EIRt~al~(alt~l)~~, a2~(a2tA2) 1~).
B~1(01,~1,02,~2)eIR}~al~(a1tB1) c o.i.. a2~(a2t~2)~iL).
Proposition 4.1:
(11) For (ol,~l,a2,~2) e B, qi -0, i-1,2, followa. -convergence to the mixed stzategy equilibrium in a finite number of steps with probability (oltoz-2o1o2).
Since the mixed strategy equilibrlum beliefs will be reached Sn a flnite number of steps each time, one can pick a subsequence of rounds in vhich thís indifference situation obtalns. In each of these rounda there is a 01-02 chance that learning vlll lead to the pure strategy equilibrius (T,L) and a(1-01)-(1-02) chance that updating leads to (B,R). Hance, for any
Bayesia, learning is the probabílity of reaching the pure strategy equillbrium (T,L) and
is the probability of reaching (B,R).Õ bvíously, the mixed strategy equillbrium is unstable with reapect [o learning if it is teached i n finite tlme. As the example shows, one of the two pure strategy equilibria will result with probabillty one. A alight modification of this example will lllustrate that the mixed strategy equilibríum may be approached ín the limit only. It is obvious, that updating will make qi(t) converge to 0.5 for both players but víll never actually reach this belief. Notice that Ln this case the relative frequency of the pure strategy choices converges to 0.5, the mixed strategy equilibrium. In thía sense both players get more and more convinced that the opponent is playing the nixed strategy 0.5, even if they actually choose a pure atrategy !n each period. Bayesian learníng As the previous examples índicate, the following cases may occur:
(a) Eícher the equilíbrlum vith learning is one of the three posaible Nash equílíbria vi [h certainty, or (b) the equilibzlum with learning la the pure strategy equilibrlum (1,1)
vith probabllity p(o1,a2) and the pura strategy equilíbrius ( 0,0) vith probability (1-p(ol,aZ)).
Note that p(.) ís e functíon of the randomisation which the players use in case of indifference.
It is possíble, [herefore, to partítíon the space of all príor distributiona IR} ínto the followíng subsets:
Q1~((Q1'~1'o2'~Z)EIR}~( q1,q2) -(1,1) with probability 1) QO~((0l'~1'02'~2)EIR4~(ql,q2) -(0,0) with probability 1)~( (al'~1'02'~2)EIR}~( qi,q2) -(ok"~) wíth probability 1) Q10~) (0l'~1'o2'~p)EIR}~(ql,q2) -(1,1) with probab111ty p(-) m m and (ql,qZ) -(1,1) wíth probability 1-p(.)).
Civen any probability distríbution on the space of parameters for the prior distríbutlons IR~, one can determine the probability of each Nash equilíbrium. I.et y be any probability measure on IRt, then Prob l(ql.qZ) -(1,1) )-v(Q1) t w(Q10)'P(al,o2). P(ol,o2) ).
Prob 1(q1.q2) -(~..~)) -h(~).
Obvíously, these probabilíties sum to one. Though ít may not be possible to predíct wíth certainty which Nash equilibrium wlll be 'learnsd' for arbitrary prlor beliefs, it ís at least posaible to predict that foz given These beliefs however will never sustain a Nash equilíbrium. -How is the speed of adjustment tovards Nash equllibrium play related to the structure of the underlying game?
A partlal ansver to the second question can be found in papers by Shapley (1964) and Rosenmuller (1971) on so-called fictitious play. Shapley (1964) shows ín an example that the iterative procesa of learning inducad by the beta distríbu[Lon family can lead to limit cyclea vhich are different from the unique míxed strategy equilibrium of the respective game if playera have three strategies available. The recent papers by Jordan (1990a Jordan ( , 1990b indicate, however, that general convergence results are possible.
But from a conceptional point of víev as well the analysis of the paper raises a number of questíons:
-Is Bayesian learning as described in this paper an adequate concept of learning ín gamesT -For what class of games is such a learring approach to equilibrium selection adequate?
In this sense, it seems as if this paper rather raises questions for further research than answering them.
Nevertheless, given the impasse reached in the analysis of games víth multíple Nash equilibría and the need to find an answer in applied vork Co the question which equilibrium will come about, this new approach seems ta be worth pursuing. In addítion, for games with incomplete information about 
